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USING BORDER TRADE ADJUSTMENTS TO 
ADDRESS LABOR RIGHTS CONCERNS UNDER 
THE WTO 
MICAH GLOBERSON* 
Prior to his passing in October 2011, Apple CEO and founder Steve Jobs 
delivered a speech at a February 2011 dinner event attended by major 
executives throughout Silicon Valley, as well as U.S. President Barack 
Obama.1 President Obama interrupted Mr. Jobs’ speech to ask what it 
would take to get Apple, a company that once prided itself on making its 
products in America but came to do nearly all of its manufacturing 
overseas, to make iPhones in the United States.2 Mr. Jobs was said to have 
replied that “[t]hose jobs aren’t coming back.”3 A New York Times article 
wrote of Mr. Jobs’ response that: 
It isn’t just that workers are cheaper abroad. Rather, Apple’s 
executives believe the vast scale of overseas factories as well as 
the flexibility, diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers 
have so outpaced their American counterparts that “Made in the 
U.S.A.” is no longer a viable option for most Apple products.4 
                                                
* Thank you to Joshua Meltzer of the Brookings Institution and Jacob Werksman of 
the European Commission for their instruction in the area of international trade, 
investment, and sustainable development at Georgetown University Law Center. 
Special thanks to Mr. Meltzer for his outstanding advice and editorial recommendations 
on the content and approach of this article. 
 Mr. Globerson is the Country Development Officer for South Sudan at the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID). He has a Master of Pacific 
International Affairs in China and International Economic Policy from the University 
of California, San Diego, a J.D. from the University of California, Davis, a B.A. in 
Philosophy from UCLA, and he plans to complete an LL.M. in International Business 
and Economic Law and a Certificate in International Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution at Georgetown University Law Center in May 2013. The views expressed in 
this article are the author’s only and do not necessarily represent those of the United 
States Agency for International Development or the U. S. Government. 
1 Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-
and-a-squeezed-middle-class.html?pagewanted=all. 
2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
4 Id. 




But at the same time, it was becoming apparent to the international 
public that Apple’s incredible productivity in China came at a price. Apple 
in 2007 audited working conditions at the Shenzhen facility of Foxconn, a 
Taiwan-based company that was the world’s biggest manufacturer of 
electronics and Apple’s main manufacturing partner.5 The prior June, 
almost a dozen Foxconn employees committed suicide not long after Apple 
increased orders in a race to meet demand for the popular iPad tablet 
device.6 Apple’s review of the Foxconn facilities revealed underage 
workers, indentured servitude conditions, and other human rights 
problems.7 The controversy over workers’ conditions at Foxconn is only 
more heated today, with whistleblowers coming forward to tell their stories 
about horrific working conditions, unreasonable hours, and other 
grievances.8 
Apple and Foxconn have been singled out for public criticism not 
because their practices are unique; on the contrary, Foxconn’s labor 
conditions might be superior to local market standards.9 Rather, the fact 
that many Americans own and daily use Apple’s iconic products like the 
iPad and iPhone, and that they associate the products with personal status, 
make some consumers feel personally responsible for contributing to the 
unfair exploitation of other human beings.10 Moreover, because Apple is a 
leader, innovator, and model (particularly with respect to its supply chain), 
its efforts to quell public pressure by demanding better practices from 
                                                
5 Ian Sherr, Apple Says China Partner Made Changes For Workers, WALL ST. J., 





8 See, e.g., Sui-Lee Wee, Insight: Young Chinese Workers Seek End to “Eating 
Bitterness”, REUTERS, Apr. 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/06/us-
china-worker-idUSBRE83504T20120406. 
9 See, e.g., Foxconn Working Conditions 2012: Company Cuts Hours, Employees 
Ask Why, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/30/foxconn-working-conditions-2012-
hours_n_1390541.html. See generally Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability 
Standards in the Global Supply Chain: Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in 
China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321, 333 (2007) (discussing human rights 
problems caused by the global supply chain and proposing solutions through corporate 
social responsibility). 
10 Cf., Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs are Built into an 
iPad, NY TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/ 
business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html (noting 
that Apple’s very enthusiastic consumer base can be a force that pressures it to improve 
labor conditions, as other consumers did for Nike and Gap). 
50 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 3:1 
Foxconn may to some degree serve to improve working conditions across 
China.11 
But what if the public shaming of Apple and Foxconn does not lead to 
significant change across the industry? And what if Americans 
subsequently insist that their elected representatives no longer allow 
imports of products made by children, by people not paid a living wage, by 
indentured laborers, by people working sixty hour weeks for eleven days in 
a row, or by others working under indecent labor conditions?12 This paper 
examines how, under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), a country 
like the U.S. might attempt to use trade measures to force the hand of 
another country with respect to workers’ rights.  
The paper begins by explaining why most restrictions on trade intended 
specifically to militate in of favor labor rights would be found 
discriminatory under the WTO. It first focuses in detail on the sections of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) likely to make a 
labor-rights related trade measure discriminatory, particularly the 
requirements for most favored nation treatment and national treatment.  
The paper then looks at exceptions under the GATT General Exceptions 
Clause that may justify and excuse a discriminatory measure promoting 
labor rights, and how such a measure would need to be crafted under the 
Clause’s chapeau. In doing so, this paper points out the critical unanswered 
questions in current jurisprudence that are central to determining whether a 
discriminatory trade measure justified by a labor rights purpose would 
receive an exception under exceptions (a) or (b) of the General Exceptions 
Clause.13 
 
I. WHAT MIGHT A LABOR-RIGHTS-SUPPORTING 
TRADE MEASURE LOOK LIKE? 
 
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”), created in 1919 by the 
Treaty of Versailles, develops internationally agreed-upon standards for 
workers’ rights.14 The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
                                                
11Charles Duhigg & Steven Greenhouse, Electronic Giant Vowing Reforms in China 
Plants, Mar. 29, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/business/ 
apple-supplier-in-china-pledges-changes-in-working-conditions.html. Notably, in 
addition to issues with the working environment itself, China receives substantial 
criticism for taking inadequate legislative and enforcement steps to prohibit 
employment discrimination. See generally Xun Zeng, Enforcing Equal Employment 
Opportunities in China, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 991, 1014-15 (2007). 
12 See, e.g., id. (referencing a report citing “numerous instances where Foxconn 
defied industry codes of conduct by having employees work more than 60 hours a 
week, and sometimes more than 11 days in a row”). 
13 See id. 
14 See About the ILO: Origins and History, INT’L LABOR ORG. (“ILO”), About the 
ILO: Origins and History, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--
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Rights at Work, adopted in 1998 and binding upon ILO member countries, 
identifies four main principles: (1) freedom of association and a right to 
collective bargaining, (2) elimination of forced labor, (3) abolition of child 
labor, and (4) elimination of employment discrimination.15 ILO 
recommends a pre-overtime work week of eight hours per day and of 
ideally forty, and no more than forty-eight, hours per week, with no more 
than twelve hours of weekly overtime.16 In addition to the ILO 
Conventions, mainstream human rights treaties, such as the United Nations 
International Bill of Human Rights, propose labor standards that all 
countries should follow.17 
There are many ways in which the U.S. could attempt to draw a line on 
what constitutes an abuse of workers’ rights, and various trade measures 
that the U.S. could use to respond to such abuses. For example, the U.S. 
could use the approach attempted in the Dolphin-Tuna case, by creating a 
“no child labor” label and mandating that manufacturing processes meet a 
certain standard in order to attain such certification.18 Alternatively, the 
U.S. could use any of a number of import-restrictive border adjustment 
measures, for example, 
• by imposing an outright ban on products of prison labor;19 
• by imposing sanctions or quantitative restrictions (including a 
partial or complete ban) on products made at below universally 
agreed upon international human rights standards (e.g., the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work or 
the International Bill of Human Rights) or the Technical Barriers 
                                                
en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
15 Declaration Overview: Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, ILO (May 1, 2004), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095898.pdf; see also Marley S. Weiss, 
International Labor and Employment Law: From Periphery to Core, 25 ABA J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 487, 495-96 (2010). ILO adopted few conventions from 1985 onward and 
became viewed as toothless until 1998, when the Declaration reinvigorated 
international labor law “from a period of stagnation and near-futility, to a wildly 
pluralistic period of effectiveness.” Id. 
16 Q&As on Business and Working Time, ILO (Sept. 1, 2010), 
http://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/business-helpdesk/WCMS_DOC_ENT_HLP_TIM_ 
FAQ_EN/lang--en/index.htm. 
17 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/; 
Michael J. Treblicock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 261, 261-62 (2005) (explaining that the Treaty of Versailles established 
the ILO). 
18 See Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT D/S21/R 
(Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter “Tuna/Dolphin I”]. 
19 See infra note 107 (discussing Turkey-Textiles case). 
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to Trade (“TBT”) Agreement;20 
• by taxing products produced by workers earning below a certain 
wage or working more than a certain number of hours per week; 
• by increasing tariffs or imposing countervailing duties intended 
to offset the cost-savings wrongly attained through unfair labor 
practices;21 or 
• by extending U.S. regulations on wages, hours, etc. to imports. 
 
The challenge for the U.S. will be to design a border adjustment that will 
be found either to not discriminate under the WTO rules or, if 
discriminatory, to be of such a nature that the U.S. is justified in invoking 
one of its specified rights to discriminate under the General Exceptions 
Clause. 
 
II. RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE MEASURES 
 
In developing a trade measure, a Member is bound to the schedules 
agreed upon at WTO admission, per Article II.22 The Member must also 
follow the principle of “most favored nation” (“MFN”) treatment, which 
requires that a Member granting a privilege to another Member must 
extend the same privilege to all other Members.23 Another central principle 
that WTO signatories must obey is that of “national treatment,” which 
prohibits countries from taking steps to favor their domestic products over 
imports.24 
 
A. GATT Article I – Most Favored Nation Treatment 
 
GATT Article I requires countries to engage in MFN treatment, meaning 
that imports from one Member country must be treated on terms no less 
favorable than those from another Member. In relevant part, Article I states 
that: 
 
any advantage . . . granted by any [WTO Member] to any product 
originating in . . . any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for the territories of all other [Members].25 
                                                
20 See infra notes 94-97 (discussing the TBT Agreement). 
21 See infra Section II.  
22 See infra Subsection 0 (discussing schedules of concessions). 
23 See infra Subsection A. 
24 See infra Subsection 0. 
25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: 




The term “like product” is a key operator in the WTO language, raising a 
central threshold question of what makes one product “like” another 
product. Empirically different products may still be “like products.” For 
example, in Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (“Japan–Alcohol”), the 
Appellate Body (“AB”) affirmed a GATT Panel decision that vodka and 
shochu are “like” products and should be taxed equivalently.26 Under 
Article I, “like” products include products that are “remotely similar” 
regardless of the context of the application.27 This broad standard includes 
“directly competitive or substitutable” products.28 There is substantial 
debate, however, regarding whether any competing or substitute products 
will be “like,” or whether facts such as the means of production or the 
competitive relationship between the products merely play a role in getting 
at the main concerns addressed by Article I (favoritism) and the like-
worded Article III (protectionism).29 
MFN prevents a Member from using sanctions or targeting taxes against 
other specific members; for example, a U.S. prohibition on Chinese iPads 
would violate MFN treatment. Another option would be to try to argue that 
a good on the market that is the product of bad labor standards is not “like” 
a competing product made under good labor conditions. However, the 
“likeness” standard under Article I is broad and generally treats competing 
and substitute goods as “like products,” so cases in which a Member that 
treats competing imports (of equal quality) differently solely on the 
grounds of how the goods are produced will tend to violate its Article I 
obligations. 
 
B. GATT Article II – Schedules of Concessions 
                                                
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 
(1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter "GATT"]. 
26 Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R 
(Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages].  
27 WON-MOG CHOI, “LIKE PRODUCTS” IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: TOWARDS A 
CONSISTENT, GATT/WTO JURISPRUDENCE 100-01, (2003). This is because the 
applicable language in Article I parallels that of both Article III:2, the “directly 
competitive or substitutable” standard, and Article III:4, the (broader) “remotely 
similar” standard, which are interpreted in EC–Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter 
“Appellate Body Report, EC–Asbestos”]; and Ad Note to GATT Article III:2, second 
sentence. Some scholars argue that the standard applies differently depending upon 
whether it is a border measure or an internal measure, but Choi rejects this view in the 
case of Article I.  
28 Id. 
29 The discussion of “likeness” continues in Subsection 0 (on National Treatment). 
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 GATT Members’ schedules of tariff concessions appear either annexed 
to the Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT of 1994 or, for later WTO entrants, 
annexed to their respective Protocols of Accession.30 Each schedule applies 
to a particular tariff, providing specific tariff concessions and other 
commitments agreed upon through trade negotiations, and including such 
details as a description of the product covered and the rate of duty and 
other charges.31 For trade in goods, the schedules include maximum tariff 
levels called “bound tariffs” or “bindings.”32 
GATT Article II governs tariffs on imports at the border, requiring that 
countries abide by their Schedules and do not impose additional duties or 
other charges.33 Article II is explicit that it does not pertain to “a charge 
equivalent to an internal tax.”34 Such measures are instead governed under 
GATT Article III:2 and referred to as “border tax adjustments.”35 
 
C.  GATT Article III – National Treatment 
 
GATT Article III permits internal taxes and regulations on both domestic 
and imported goods, so long as they do not give favor to domestic products 
over imports.36 Article III specifically requires that internal taxes or other 
charges should be the same for like products and that “products . . . 
imported . . . shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin.”37 As with Article I, 
concerning MFN, the “like products” standard does not require that the 
products be physically identical but instead focuses on whether they are 
competing products or economic substitutes.38 For this reason, it is often 
                                                
30 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (“WTO”), Current Situation of Schedules of WTO 
Members, at Section I, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules 
_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm (last visited April 26, 2012). 
31 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), Goods Schedules: Members’ 
Commitments, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm (last visited 
April 26, 2012). 
32 Id. 
33 GATT, art. II(1)(a)-(b). 
34 GATT, art. II((2)(a). 
35 Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970) at 
paras. 7 & 14, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax. 
pdf [hereinafter Border Tax Adjustment Report]. 
36 GATT, art. III(1). 
37 GATT, art. III(2)&(4). 
38 See Choi supra at note 27; Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau & Julia Reinaud, Staff 
Working Paper, The Interface Between the trade and Climate Change Regimes: 
Scoping the Issues 6, WTO ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DIVISION (Dec. 
2011); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory 
Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 249, 
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believed that a Member will not be able to claim that two otherwise 
indistinguishable products are not “like products” solely on process 
grounds, e.g., that one product is made under poor labor standards and the 
other is made under internationally acceptable labor standards. 
 
1. Japan–Alcohol  
 
In Japan–Alcohol, the U.S., European Community (“EC”), and Canada 
disputed a Japanese liquor tax law that divided various types of alcoholic 
beverages into ten categories with sub-categories: sake, sake compound, 
shochu, mirin, beer, wine, whisky, spirits, liqueurs, and miscellaneous.39  
Different tax rates applied to each category and sub-category defined by the 
law.40 
The EC argued that “spirits” (vodka, gin, white rum, and genever) are 
“like” under the first sentence of Article III:2 and therefore may not be 
taxed at different rates or, in the alternative, that the spirits are “directly 
competitive and substitutable products” under the second sentence of 
Article III:2.41 Canada seized on the same “directly competitive and 
substitutable product” language from the second sentence of Article III:2, 
arguing that tax differences distort the products’ relative prices, thereby 
distorting consumer choice between the products, and ultimately distorting 
the products’ competitive relationship.42  The United States argued that the 
Japanese tax regime for alcohol was devised to protect shochu production 
and, paired with the similarity in their characteristics and end uses, the 
brown and white spirits are “like products” per the first sentence of Art. 
III:2; alternatively, all distilled spirits are “directly competitive and 
substitutable” per the second sentence of Article III:2 for the same 
reasons.43 Japan, on the other hand, countered that the purpose of the tax 
law was not protectionism, nor did it afford protectionist benefits; 
                                                
260 (2000) (contrasting vodka and shochu, which are easily distinguishable but 
considered “like” products, with two hypothetical chemicals that are structurally 
identical except with respect to a single atom but have completely different physical 
properties (one is a potent explosive or neurotoxin and the other is harmless) but would 
clearly not be considered as “like” products, underscoring the point that “the issue of 
‘likeness’ is distinct from the issue of physical similarity, and not even very closely 
related. The chemicals are much more physically similar than vodka and shochu, but 
they are much less ‘like.’”). 
39 Panel Report, Japan–Alcohol ¶ 2.2, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R & WT/DS11/R (July 
11, 1996) [hereinafter “Panel Report, Japan–Alcohol”]. 
40 Id. ¶ 2.3. 
41 Id. ¶ 3.1. 
42 Id. ¶ 3.2. 
43 Id. ¶ 3.3. 
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moreover, the various product categories are not “like” under the first 
sentence of Article III:2, nor “directly competitive and substitutable 
products” under the second sentence and, consequently, the tax law is valid 
within the scope of MFN.44 
In its analysis, the AB looked at the first two sentences of Article III:2 in 
their respective order. In the first sentence, products are “like,” as 
“construed narrowly so as not to condemn measures that its strict terms are 
not meant to condemn,” in which case the measure fails if the tax rates are 
even minimally different.45 Next, under the second sentence, where 
products are not “like” under the narrow definition of the first sentence but 
instead “like” under the “substitutable and directly competing” standard, 
the measure fails under the “not similarly taxed” standard only if the 
difference in tax rates is more than de minimis.46 
The AB in Japan–Alcohol upheld the Panel’s finding that shochu and 
vodka are “like” under both the first and second sentences of Article III:2, 
such that even a minimal difference in taxation is impermissible, thereby 
making Japan’s measure impermissible.47 First, the AB surmised whether 
the dissimilar taxation was applied ‘“so as to afford protection on domestic 
production” on a case-by-case basis by looking at “the design, the 
architecture, and the revealing structure of the measure.”48 Whereas the 
Panel held that this was established merely by observing that the dissimilar 
taxation exceeded a de minimis level and that the spirits were “directly 
competitive or substitutable products,” the AB insisted that the level must 
go well beyond a de minimis level in order to demonstrate protectionism.49 
Rather, the AB found the Panel’s additional findings showing significant 
adverse effects on foreign competition were essential in demonstrating that 
the measure afforded protectionism.50 Specifically, the AB focused on the 
Panel’s findings that Japan’s disputed tax “makes it difficult for foreign-
produced shochu to penetrate the Japanese market” and “does not 
guarantee equality of competitive conditions between shochu and [other 
spirits],” which led the Panel to conclude that “Japan manages to ‘isolate’ 
domestically produced shochu from foreign competition[.]”51 To the AB, 
these additional facts were not extraneous, but instead essential evidence 
demonstrating that Japan acted in a protectionist manner.52 The AB then 
                                                
44 Id. ¶ 3.4. 
45 Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 26, ¶ 
19-20.  
46 Id. ¶ 27. 
47 Id. ¶ 32. 
48 Id. ¶ 29. 
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confirmed its decision by noting that it reflected the reasonableness and 
flexibility of the WTO rules and that it comported with the “customary 
rules of public international law,” a reference to Annex 2 of the WTO 
Agreement, known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).53 
 
2. “Least Favored Nation” Treatment  
 
 The Japan–Alcohol holding was softened slightly by Korea–Various 
Measures on Beef to include “no less favorable” treatment.54 In that case, 
the AB held that a Korean regulation established a “dual retail system” 
inconsistent with GATT Article III:4.55 Nonetheless, the AB also agreed 
with Korea’s argument that Article III:4 only requires that WTO members 
“provide equal conditions of competition,” meaning that “differential 
treatment” may be acceptable, so long as it is “no less favorable” to foreign 
imports than to domestic goods.56 In this regard, differently taxed products 
found “like” under the “narrow” reading of the first sentence of Article 
III:2, or found “like” as competitors or substitutes under the second 
sentence, can in cases of “less favorable treatment” nonetheless be found 
acceptable under Article III where the competitive harm is distributed in 
such a way as to dispel the appearance of protectionism. The AB in EC – 
Asbestos clarified that: 
The term “less favorable treatment” expresses the general 
principle, in Article III:1, that internal regulations “should not be 
applied . . . so as to afford protection to domestic production”57 
 
In other words, the case-by-case likeness analysis requires attention not 
only to whether the products have an economically competitive relationship 
but to the actual impact that the measure in question has on that 
relationship, and whether it should be construed as of a protectionist nature. 
                                                
53 Id. at 31 (citing Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), Article 
3.2 [hereinafter “DSU”]). 
54 Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report 
Korea–Beef], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/ 
index_abreport_kl_e.htm#ds161abr. 
55 Id. ¶ 186(e). 
56 Id. ¶¶ 16, 137. 
57 Appellate Body Report, EC–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, supra note 27, ¶ 100. 
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Indeed, the Panel in EC – Biotech Products confirmed this approach when 
it held that an EC regulation on genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) 
was not “less favorable” to imports because it treated both imported and 
domestic GMOs and non-GMOs the same way, and the disparate effect of 
the regulation was in fact a direct consequence of subjective government 
and consumer perceptions.58 Where a labor-rights-supporting trade measure 
is extended by a Member country to apply to domestic and imported 
products alike, and it would otherwise violate MFN treatment, a defense 
might be to show that the treatment is no less favorable to foreign products 
than to domestic products. That the WTO permits the “least favored 
nation” defense to a dispute over dissimilar treatment of otherwise “like” 
products strongly suggests that it is not the physical makeup of the 
products, or their competitive relationship, but instead the rejection of 
protectionism that is the overriding concern at the heart of the likeness 
analysis. 
 
3. Production and Process Methods (PPMs) 
 
Suppose you encounter two shirts in the marketplace that are physically 
indistinguishable. You learn that one was made by an Italian tailor working 
40 hours a week for a reasonable wage, whereas the other was made in a 
sweatshop in rural China. Can the WTO distinguish the two products as not 
“like,” and thereby allow member states to treat these imports differently, 
when they are not only economic substitutes but physically 
indistinguishable? In other words, can a “likeness” distinction depend 
solely on the method by which a product is manufactured, or must two 
products at a minimum present a chemical, structural, or other physical 
difference (however subtle) before the WTO can consider them not “like”? 
To analyze this question, some commentators distinguish between 
product related production and process methods (pr-PPMs) and non-
product related production and process methods (npr-PPMs), the difference 
being that the production methods are in some way incorporated into the 
physical product (perhaps in only a trace amount) in the former case and 
not in the latter.59 As demonstrated in Japan–Alcohol, the WTO does not 
always allow discrimination where the differences relate to the final 
products themselves (i.e., shochu versus vodka and other spirits).60 
Nonetheless, where similar products produced through different methods 
                                                
58 Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products ¶ 7.2415, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R & WT/DS293/R 
(Sept. 29, 2006). 
59 Low, Marceau & Reinaud, supra note 38, at 7. 
60 Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 26, ¶ 32.  
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have physical differences as a result, the WTO tends to recognize that the 
distinction can serve as a foundation for attacking their “likeness.”61 The 
jurisprudence is more ambiguous, however, for measures distinguishing 
products as not “like” based solely on npr-PPMs (e.g., a product of child 
slave labor versus a physically indistinguishable product made in 
accordance with recognized international labor standards).62 The un-
adopted US–Tuna report, for example, presumed that products differing 
only in terms of their npr-PPMs must be “like,” whereas the EC–Asbestos 
holding suggested that npr-PPMs can be relevant to the likeness 
determination.63 Specifically, the AB in EC – Asbestos clarified that: 
 
the “characteristics” of a product include, in our view, any 
objectively definable “features,” “qualities,” “attributes,” or other 
”distinguishing mark” of a product. Such “characteristic”’ might 
relate, inter alia, to a product’s composition, size, shape, color, 
texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity, 
density, or viscosity . . . .64 
 
However, the AB then proceeded to add that: 
 
product characteristics include, not only features and qualities 
intrinsic to the product itself, but also related “characteristics,” 
such as the means of identification, the presentation and the 
appearance of a product . . . .65 
 
In this regard, the AB appeared to hold that the likeness determination 
can consider more than physical characteristics, but did not go so far as to 
definitively state that the difference could be in the form of an npr-PPM.66 
Another case that came close to answering the question of whether a 
distinction in “likeness” can be made on the grounds of an npr-PPM was 
                                                
61 See, e.g., GATT Panel Report, United States–Taxes on Petroleum and Certain 
Imported Substances, L/6175 - 34S/136 at 17-19 (June 5, 1987) (adopted June, 17 
1987) [hereinafter “GATT Panel Report, United States–Superfund”] (allowing a 
difference in tax treatment where an otherwise identical product contained traces of a 
specific chemical). 
62 Id. at 7.  
63 Id. 
64 Appellate Body Report EC–Asbestos supra note 27, ¶ 67. 
65 Id. 
66 See Joost Pauwelyn, Working Paper, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and 
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law, 
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVT’L POL. SOL. 27 (Apr. 2007). 
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the US—Superfund case.67 In US—Superfund, the Panel permitted the U.S. 
to extend a domestic tax on specific chemicals to imports that used the 
same chemicals.68 Unfortunately, however, the Panel did not specify 
whether the chemicals needed to be physically present in the product, or 
merely used in the production process, leaving the question open.69 
Joost Pauwelyn, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute 
of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, looks to 
the language from Article II:2(a) permitting “charges on imports equivalent 
to internal taxes imposed in respect of an article from which the imported 
product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part” to argue 
that npr-PPMs can potentially be “part of” the imported product.70 Other 
commentators look to the portion of Article III:2 saying that imports “shall 
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products,” to argue that the imposition of taxes on npr-PPMs at 
the border is consistent with national treatment.71 Patrick Low and 
Gabrielle Marceau of the WTO, and Julia Reinaud of the Institute for 
Industrial Productivity, point out that both of these provisions, however, 
only refer to taxes and charges and not to non-price regulations.72 
Consequently, many of the types of regulations generally applied to 
businesses to protect labor (e.g., the right to form a union, prohibitions on 
child and prison labor, maximum work hour limits, etc.) may be difficult to 
require for imports on such grounds. 
 
4.  Pauwelyn View 
 
Although Joost Pauwelyn generally holds the belief that products 
different only in terms of their production process will be considered 
“like,” he notes that, in theory, two otherwise identical products could be 
shown as not “like” based on differences in consumer preference (e.g., 
consumers demonstrate measurably different market preferences with 
respect to “fair trade” coffee versus exploitative coffee).73 Pauwelyn does 
this by showing that the WTO cases use four criteria to judge likeness: (1) 
                                                
67 GATT Panel Report, United States—Superfund, supra note 61. 
68 Id. ¶¶ 17-19. 
69 Id. 
70 Low, Marceau & Reinaud, supra note 38, at 8 (citing Pauwelyn, supra note 66, at 
19-20). The Graduate Institute, Joost Pauwelyn, Professor of International Law 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/ctei/pauwelyn.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
71 Low, Marceau & Reinaud, supra note 38, at 8. 
72 Id. at i and 8. 
73 Pauwelyn, supra note 66, at fn. 76 (Apr. 2007) (citing Appellate Body Report EC – 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, supra note 27, ¶ 
101)). 
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physical characteristics of the products; (2) end-use; (3) consumer tastes 
and habits; and (4) tariff classification, picking out “consumer tastes and 
habits” as the only criterion that could make otherwise physically identical 
products different.74 But Pauwelyn then goes on to say that, if consumers 
already prefer and will pay a premium for a product based on their tastes 
and habits, then that circumstance alone would obviate the need for any 
government-sponsored competitiveness provision.75 
Changing consumer preference may itself be a way around the fact that 
“product likeness” determinations focus on the product rather than the 
process behind its manufacture. Certification marks, protected under 
trademark law, are used to target both pr-PPMs and npr-PPMs.76 For 
example, Kosher, ISO, fair trade, organic and other labels are licensed for 
use subject to review by a private or public sector entity and their uses are 
protected by international treaty.77 This scheme is weaker than trade 
measures because one must trust that consumers will become educated 
enough to identify the labels and then take moral responsibility by paying 
what could potentially be more for the certified product.78 There is also a 
risk that other parties will create similar labels that result in consumer 
confusion and undermine the purpose of standards-based trademark 
labeling. In Dolphin-Tuna, the United States attempted unsuccessfully to 
require that all tuna imports obtain a certification mark that the product was 
                                                
74 Id. These factors appear in Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, supra note 26, at Subsection H.1(a). The factors originally come from 
Border Tax Adjustment Report, supra note 36, ¶18. 
75 See Pauwelyn, supra note 66, at 76. 
76 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), Certification 
Marks, 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/collective_marks/certification_marks.htm (last 
visited May 8, 2012); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, FAQ, Frequently Asked 
Questions about Trademarks >> What is a Certification Mark?, 
http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp (last visited May 8, 2012). 
77 See, e.g., Standard Certification Marks, TECHNIK.NET, http://www.technick.net/ 
public/code/cp_dpage.php?aiocp_dp=guide_safetymarks (last visited May 8, 2012). 
See generally PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MADRID AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE 
INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS adopted at Madrid on June 27, 1989, as 
amended on Oct. 3, 2006 and on Nov. 12, 2007, available at http://www.wipo. 
int/treaties/en/registration/madrid_protocol/. COMMON REGULATIONS UNDER THE 
MADRID AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS AND 
THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO THAT AGREEMENT at Rule 9(4)(a)(x) as in force on Jan. 1, 
2012, available at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/common_regulations. 
htm (protecting certification marks).  
78 Howse and Regan suggest that the cost to the extra consumer of purchasing the 
certified product may serve as a major factor in the effectiveness of this approach, 
particularly where consumers must act collectively to effect a particular social 
objective and the individual consumer lacks any guarantee that others will make the 
same economic sacrifice. See supra note 38, at 273. 
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“dolphin safe,” per a specific set of processes and standards.79 However, 
this additional intervention by the government (i.e., a government mandate 
that all imports bear a certain standards-certifying mark) might not be 
necessary in order for the certifying mark to have a significant effect on the 
market. 
 
5. Howse and Regan Approach 
 
Robert L. Howse, the Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law at 
the New York University School of Law, and Donald Regan, the William 
W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan 
Department of Philosophy, take a very different stance on the likeness 
question by arguing that process of production is only relevant to the 
likeness analysis insofar as it indicates whether a measure is protectionist in 
nature, which is the primary issue at the heart of the national treatment 
analysis.80 To justify this argument, Howse and Regan look to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter “Vienna Convention”).81 By 
default, the Vienna Convention applies only between states and not 
necessarily to treaties between states and international organizations; 
however, in the interests of clarity and predictability in the dispute system, 
WTO panels consistently refer to the Vienna Convention in interpreting the 
GATT.82 Moreover, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which includes 
rules that Members agree to follow in resolving disputes, explicitly states 
that WTO agreements will be clarified “in accordance with customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law,” giving the WTO dispute 
settlement body possible grounds for drawing on the Vienna Convention as 
a widely accepted international treaty providing rules of treaty 
interpretation.83 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention says that “A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
                                                
79 Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 18. 
80 New York University School of Law, Robert Howse, https://its.law.nyu.edu/ 
facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=28550 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013); University of 
Michigan, Donald Reagan, http://www.lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/people/ci. 
regandonald_ci.detail (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
81 Howse & Regan, supra note 38, at 261. 
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 1-5, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining to treaties as “between states” and clarifying that 
the Convention only applies between states and not between states and international 
organizations, except under specific circumstances); Peter C. Maki, Note: Interpreting 
GATT Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Method to Increase the 
Legitimacy of the Dispute Settlement System, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 343, 352 
(2000) (noting that this clarify form the Convention allows panels to avoid case-by-
case analysis); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An 
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 29 (1999); Howse & 
Regan, supra note 38, at 261. 
83 See DSU, supra note 53. 
2013]   LABOR RIGHTS CONCERNS UNDER THE WTO  63 
 
 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.” In an attempt to identify the “ordinary meaning” of 
“likeness” as referenced in GATT Article III, Howse and Regan then argue 
that: 
If we assign “like” its ordinary meaning in context, “not differing 
in any respect relevant to an actual non-protectionist regulatory 
policy,” then physically identical products that differ only in their 
processing histories may be “unlike” because the processing 
differences may be relevant to such a policy.84 
 
They then emphasize that Article I and Article III do not suggest that any 
particular regulatory policies are inadmissible, except favoritism between 
nations and protectionism, and therefore do not expressly rule out npr-
PPM-based trade measures.85 Howse and Regan read Article III(2)&(4), 
which deal with likeness, in light of Article III(1), which lays out the 
general anti-protectionist policy of national treatment, concluding that the 
interpretative focus should not primarily be on comparing the physical 
traits of products, but rather on whether the measure is protectionist vis-à-
vis foreign imports.86 They also counter commentators who say that the 
“aims” and “effects” of a measure are central in the likeness analysis by 
explaining that those factors are only important insofar as they are essential 
in determining whether a particular measure constitutes protectionism.87 
Under the Howse and Regan view, a product can be distinguished as not 
“like” another physically identical product by virtue of a difference in 
process, and a trade measure might treat the two products differently even 
if those products are economic substitutes.88 For example, a product made 
under ILO-acceptable labor standards might be distinguishable from an 
otherwise identical product made at below those standards. According to 
Howse and Regan, the WTO assesses the legitimacy of the distinction by 
                                                
84 Howse & Regan, supra note 38, at 261 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 268. It is worth noting that in the portion of the holding in Japan–Alcohol 
concerning likeness, the AB also explicitly draws on the “ordinary meaning” of Article 
III(2). See id. at 260. It is also worth noting that Howse and Regan’s approach is very 
similar to (and consistent with) the “less favorable treatment” approach described 
above, which overrides other standards by getting directly at the competitive effects of 
the measure and, in particular, whether those effects suggest a protectionist intent. See 
supra notes 61-64. 
87 Howse & Regan, supra note 38, at 261. 
88 See generally id. at 269 (comparing “process-based” and “ county-based” 
restrictions on turtle-friendly shrimp nets and turtle-unfriendly shrimp nets). 
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asking only whether the measure is protectionist.89 These commentators 
further assert that even if a secondary purpose is to eliminate the 
competitive disadvantage of domestic producers (in this case, by bearing 
the costs associated with compliance with the ILO Conventions or other 
internationally recognized labor standards), accounting for this economic 
externality serves the primary purpose of ensuring a minimum labor 
standard for all workers, and is therefore not in itself protectionism.90 
Howse and Regan go on to emphasize that consumers in a Member country 
may care equally about social issues that happen at home and abroad, so 
the fact that a Member claiming discrimination might (hypothetically) not 
share the same concerns (here, minimum labor standards) may be 
immaterial where the member imposing the restriction does care about the 
issue as it applies universally.91 
In looking at which measures are and are not likely to pass as non-
protectionist, Howse and Regan comment that labor legislation that by its 
nature applies differently in different geographic areas, such as minimum 
wage standards, will be harder to uphold, whereas universal norms such as 
against slave or child labor would be easier to support as grounds for non-
protectionist trade measures.92 Given purchasing power and other 
differences, minimum wage requirements would be particularly hard to set 
and justify as part of a trade measure.93 If Howse and Regan are correct in 
their analysis, Members may succeed in implementing trade measures that 
treat products differently depending upon the process by which they were 
produced, and those policies with the greatest chance of passing WTO 
scrutiny as nondiscriminatory per Article I and Article III would be those 
based on universal principles (rather than those that may apply differently 
in one country context versus another, such as a reasonable standard for 
minimum wage). 
Howse and Regan believe that the product/process distinction is not the 
central determinant of “likeness.” However, other scholars who believe that 
the “likeness” standards in Article I and Article III leave no space for 
distinguishing goods based on differences in process often look to the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”), which 
                                                
89 See id. at 272 (interpreting objections to the trade measures that are justified by the 
value of their consequences to mean trade measure adopted without protectionist 
motives have no efficiency costs). 
90 The examples provided by Howse and Regan derive from the facts of Shrimp-
Turtle, but the same arguments would here apply to labor rights. Id. at 280. 
91 Id. at 281. Howse and Reagan also argue that, regarding the question of “who gets 
to decide” a moral belief, it must be the right of the country to make such 
determinations independently insofar as actions apply within that country’s borders. Id. 
at 281-82. 
92 Id. at 284. 
93 Id. 
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applies to technical regulations that “lay down product characteristics or 
their related processes and production methods.”94 Under the TBT 
Agreement, technical standards must comply with the Code of Good 
Practice.95 The Code emphasizes standardization, requires collective 
standard-setting with periods of review, forbids the creation of standards 
constituting protectionism, and discourages the creation of unnecessary 
obstacles to trade.96 Because the TBT Agreement is aimed at unifying 
international standards as much as possible, it might represent an inroad for 
the application of internationally agreed upon labor standards.97 
 
D. GATT Article VI – Subsidies, dumping, and countervailing 
duties 
 
Michael J. Treblicock, Professor of Law at the University of Toronto, 
and Robert Howse discuss the possibility of using GATT Article VI Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties to make a case that countries not 
meeting internationally-recognized labor standards engage in “social 
dumping,” or indirect and implicit subsidization.98 They are quick to reject 
this approach because low-cost, low-skilled labor is arguably critical to 
developing countries’ competitive advantage in many instances; because 
economic studies on the effects of trade with low-wage economies show 
that these lower wages do relatively little (versus other factors such as 
technological change or public investments in education, health care, 
infrastructure, or law enforcement) to drive down wages for low-skill jobs 
in competitor economies; and because economic theory suggests that the 
immediate imposition of common international labor standards modeled on 
existing developed-country standards would reduce economic welfare in all 
countries (including both importers and exporters).99 
The “social dumping” approach closely mirrors Joseph Stiglitz’s 
proposal that excessive carbon emissions in inadequately regulated 
                                                
94 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (1994) [hereinafter “TBT Agreement”]. 
95 Id. at Article 4. 
96 Id. at Annex 3; Treblicock & Howse, supra note 17, at 292. 
97 See SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 128 
(2011) (considering the ILO standards as a possible candidate for inclusion through the 
TBT Agreement because “they might be deemed to be based on an international 
standard and therefore ‘rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to 
trade’ under Article 2(5).”) 
98 See Treblicock & Howse, supra note 17, at 266. 
99 Id. at 267-69. 
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countries should be treated as unfair subsidies because, in such cases, the 
firms are not paying for the full cost of production.100 In the labor context, 
the argument would be that, by putting an unjustifiable burden on the 
worker (e.g., through unreasonably long hours, child labor, inadequate pay, 
etc.), the firm is not paying the full production cost. Joost Pauwelyn rejects 
this argument because the WTO rules say that a subsidy is a financial 
contribution by a government, whereas this type of “subsidy” involves only 
a failure by the government to act.101 Pauwelyn also points to the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which clarifies that 
countervailing duties to offset foreign government subsidies can be levied 
only where the subsidy is “specific to an enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries . . . within the jurisdiction of the granting 
authority.”102 Therefore, where the counterpart government has not targeted 
any particular business units within its jurisdiction or provided a formal 
subsidy (rather than simply failing to act), it seems the WTO subsidies 
rules will not apply. 
Where the subsidy argument might succeed, however, is where the 
government’s failure to act when “government revenue that is otherwise 
due is foregone or not collected.”103 In United States–Tax Treatment for 
“Foreign Sales Corporations,” the WTO AB determined that what is 
“otherwise due” refers to “the prevailing domestic standard of the Member 
in question.”104 China, for example, is an ILO member country and has 
various laws protecting labor rights.105 To the extent that another Member 
can demonstrate that China knowingly neglects enforcement and/or enables 
companies to violate these existing laws, it is conceivable that a case can be 
made for calling this a ‘subsidy’ equivalent to a financial contribution by 
the government.106 This may be a hard case to make, however, if the 
violations are not in an easily quantifiable form (e.g., foregone pension, 
                                                
100 Joseph Stiglitz, A New Agenda for Global Warming, 9 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, July 
2006, available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ev.2006.3.7/ev.2006.3.7.1210/ 
ev.2006.3.7.1210.xml?format=INT. 
101 Pauwelyn, supra note 66, at 14-15. 
102 Id. at 15 (citing WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures, 
Articles 1.2, 22, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf). 
103 Id. at Article 1.1(a)(ii). 
104 WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted on 20 March 2000, ¶ 90. 
105 ILO Labour Act–China (July 5, 1994) available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/ 
docs/WEBTEXT/37357/64926/E94CHN01.htm. 
106 C.f., Stanley James, Foxconn Auditor Finds ‘Serious’ Violations of Chinese Law, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
29/foxconn-auditor-finds-serious-violations-of-chinese-law.html (discussing how the 
violations uncovered at Foxconn were in violation of China’s domestic labor laws). 
Presumably, these violations would need to be systematically and deliberately ignored 
such that they reflected a conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the Chinese 
government to provide a benefit to companies. This may be extremely difficult to 
show. 
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medical, or other payments) and absent strong evidence of an intent to give 
advantage to domestic companies (i.e., rather than mere ineptness in 
enforcement). 
 
E. GATT Article XI – General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions 
 
GATT Article XI reflects a preference toward tariffs over quotas that is a 
“cornerstone” of the GATT and dates back to the Uruguay Round, in which 
the original Members sought to phase out quantitative restrictions for 
textiles and agriculture.107 Article XI:1 begins by stating that: 
 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export 
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained . . . on 
the importation of any product . . . .108 
 
As this text indicates, Article XI applies generally to the importation of 
products, regardless of the form of the restriction.109 Moreover, in addition 
to a quota or other partial limit on imports, an outright ban on a certain 
product would also constitute a “quantitative restriction” (i.e., of zero) and 
therefore would be inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1.110 
Even where a measure imposes a quantitative restriction, or violates 
MFN, national treatment, or some other combination of GATT rules, it 
may nonetheless be justified and therefore allowed, provided that it falls 
within one or more of the exceptions provided under the General 
Exceptions Clause. 
 
III. GATT ARTICLE XX – THE GENERAL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE 
 
Article XX of the GATT, the General Exceptions Clause, offers a right 
to Member countries to discriminate in violation of other GATT 
obligations where such discrimination is justified as specified in one or 
                                                
107 Panel Report, Turkey–Textiles, ¶¶ 9.63-9.65, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999). 
108 GATT, art. XI(1).  
109 Panel Report, India–Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, ¶¶ 7.318-7.322 
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec. 21, 2001) (holding that, because the standard 
concerns whether some restriction applies to imports, even non-border measures may in 
some instances violate Article XI); Panel Report on US–Shrimp, ¶ 7.16 WT/DS58/R 
(May 15, 1998) (holding that certifications can amount to “prohibitions or restrictions” 
per Article XI(1)). 
110 Panel Report, Canada—Periodicals, ¶ 5.5, WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997). 
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more of the listed exceptions.111 Exception (e) provides an exception 
“relating to the products of prison labour.”112 The “relating to” clause is 
normally interpreted relatively broadly by the WTO Appellate Body.113 
 
A. GATT Article XX(e) – Products of Prison Labor 
 
The ILO addresses the use of prison labor in the Forced Labour 
Convention (No. 29).114 Under the ILO definition, 
 
forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work or service which 
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and 
for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.115 
 
 For government-sponsored punitive labor, the ILO makes an exception; 
however, the requirement that an individual must offer him/herself 
“voluntarily” still applies when companies utilize prison labor.116 To the 
extent that the relationship between the company and the prisoner does not 
resemble that of free labor, the ILO recognizes the relationship as involving 
labor rights abuse.117 Therefore, products of prison labor are not necessarily 
labor rights abuses, but in many cases might reflect abuses, particularly 
where the products originate from private companies (i.e., rather than 
government-owned and -managed institutions). 
If a Member seeks to apply a quantitative restriction in the form of a ban 
to products of prison labor, that action would invoke Article XI of the 
                                                
111 See GATT, art. XX. 
112 Id. at XX(e). 
113 Id. As compared to exceptions that use the language “necessary to . . .” Pauwelyn, 
supra note 66, at fn. 93. 
114 Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, ILO No. 29, (June 28, 
1930) [hereinafter “Forced Labor Convention”].  
115 Id. at art. 2(1). 
116 The definition makes an exception for “any work or service exacted from any 
person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work 
or service is carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and that 
the said person is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals, 
companies or associations” Id. at art. 2(2)(c). But the Convention does not give the 
same exception to non-government entities: “No concession granted to private 
individuals, companies or associations shall involve any form of forced or compulsory 
labour for the production or the collection of products which such private individuals, 
companies or associations utilise or in which they trade.” Id. at art. 5(1). 
117 See ILO, Q&As on Business and Forced Labour >> Use of prison labour (last 
updated Sept. 01, 2010), http://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/business-helpdesk/faqs/ 
WCMS_DOC_ENT_HLP_FL_FAQ_EN/lang--en/index.htm (offering a set of 
indicators used by the ILO to determine whether the conditions of employment are 
similar to those of a free labor relationship). 
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GATT, Quantitative Restrictions.118 An outright ban would represent a 
prohibition or restriction in violation of the Article; however, the Member 
could justify that violation by showing (1) that the ban does indeed serve to 
restrict products of prison labor under exception (e) of the Article XX and 
that (2) the measure is tailored narrowly so as not to violate the chapeau of 
Article XX, which says that the measure must not involve: 
 
(a)   “arbitrary discrimination” (between countries where the same 
conditions prevail); 
(b)   “unjustifiable discrimination” (with the same qualifier); or 
(c)   a “disguised restriction” on international trade.119 
 
The chapeau is said to embody the international law principle of “good 
faith.”120 Although Article XX(e) specifically allows for restrictions on 
products of prison labor, a ban on such products that is needlessly over-
protective will violate the chapeau and be deemed as not justified under 
Article XX. In U.S.–Shrimp, the AB characterized the chapeau as striking a 
balance between the WTO Member’s right to invoke an Article XX 
exception and the same Member’s duty to respect the rights of other 
members, as evaluated on a case-by-case basis.121 
The AB in U.S.–Shrimp found that arbitrary discrimination exists when a 
measure fails to account for the fact that different countries face different 
circumstances.122 A country imposing a ban on prison labor thus would 
need to evaluate the costs that its restriction would impose on other WTO 
                                                
118 See GATT, art. XI. 
119 This language, quoted from the Appellate Body, isolates each of the three main 
conditions given in the chapeau. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, p. 23WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) 
[hereinafter US—Gasoline]. The Appellate Body then writes that “‘Arbitrary 
discrimination’, ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised restriction’ on 
international trade may . . . be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It 
is clear to us that ‘disguised restriction’ includes disguised discrimination in 
international trade.”  Id. at p. 25. See also Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade – 
The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111, 140, 144 (Mar. 
2012) (stating that the Article XX chapeau “focuses on ensuring that the measure has 
not been applied in ways that constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination or 
that is a disguised restriction on international trade.”). 
120 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 158, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter “U.S.–Shrimp”]. 
121 Id. ¶¶ 156, 159. Accordingly, the AB in U.S.–Shrimp was explicit that that the 
first step is to evaluate whether the measure in question corresponds to a right listed in 
Article XX, then the second step is to evaluate whether the measure is applied fairly or 
abuses the right(s) invoked. Id. ¶¶ 119–20 (citing U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 119, ¶ 22). 
122 U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 120, ¶ 177. 
70 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 3:1 
Members, including the administrative and producer costs of meeting new 
standards or baselines.123 Depending upon how the Member requires 
approval or certification to meet the conditions of the ban before it may 
import products, a country or its producers might need to effect significant 
procedural changes, and these changes may be costly. Particularly where 
systems and procedures for identifying products of prison labor are already 
in place in other Member countries, the Member imposing the ban should 
focus on whether another measure is comparable in effectiveness, enables 
exporting countries to take advantage of their own capacities and unique 
circumstances, and yet still achieves the outcome desired.124 
Where costs are foreseeable and not “merely inadvertent or 
unavoidable,” the measure will be deemed to represent “unjustifiable 
discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade” where 
such costs are not mitigated.125 This puts an obligation on the Member 
putting forward the measure to provide other Members with an opportunity 
to be heard, to hear arguments against the measure, and to give a written 
decision.126 Where a Member fails to offer such a review as a matter of 
procedural fairness and due process, the measure will be found to represent 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.127 Moreover, the manner of 
application of the measure itself should be transparent and predictable (i.e., 
rather than “informal” or “casual”) in order to adequately notify exporting 
Members of what steps they must take to reasonably ensure compliance.128 
                                                
123 Cf., U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 119, ¶¶ 28–29 (faulting the United States dually 
for failing to “explore adequately means . . . of mitigating the administrative problems 
relied on for rejecting individual baselines for foreign refiners; and to count the costs 
for foreign refiners that would result from the imposition of statutory baselines”). 
124 See Meltzer supra note 119, at 146. Meltzer emphasizes that a measure that does 
not acknowledge other approaches that effectively achieve the same policy goal by 
different means will tend to be interpreted by the dispute resolution body as an 
inappropriate attempt to force other countries to conform their polices accordingly, and 
rejected as arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination inconsistent with WTO 
commitments. Id. citing US–Shrimp, supra note 120, ¶ 165. The AB was specifically 
concerned with the uniform nature of the measure applied by the U.S., noting, for 
example, that some shrimp exports would be excluded from the U.S. market using 
methods identical to those used in the U.S., solely because they were caught in the 
waters of countries not certified by the U.S. Id. ¶¶. 164-5. 
125 This was the finding in US–Gasoline, where the measure complied with Article 
XX(g), but the discrimination was foreseen and the U.S. was found responsible for an 
“omission” by failing to mitigate in advance. US–Gasoline, supra note 119. 
126 Appellate Body Report on US—Shrimp, supra note 120, ¶¶ 180-83. In US–Shrimp, 
the AB faulted the U.S. for failing to negotiate with Asian countries to accommodate 
their existing measures for reducing turtle deaths from shrimp trawling and instead 
applying U.S. standards. Id. ¶ 161. 
127 Id. ¶ 184. 
128 The AB in US–Shrimp deemed the “rigidity and inflexibility” of the U.S. 
certification process to constitute “arbitrary discrimination” under the chapeau. Id. ¶ 
177. The AB also found “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination where the same 
conditions prevail” on the basis of “due process” where the approval process was 
“informal” and “casual” and where prospective importers did not have an opportunity 
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If a ban on goods produced with prison labor falls squarely under the 
Article XX(e) exception and thus is carefully tailored to eliminate 
unnecessary costs, respects existing approaches that effect the same policy 
objective, and extends opportunities for due process and procedural 
fairness to dissenting Members, then the measure would likely succeed 
under the Article XX(e) exception, even if found discriminatory under one 
or more other articles of the GATT.  
Looking back to the ILO definition of forced and compulsory labor, it is 
worth noting that the ILO does not perceive all forms of prison labor as 
labor rights abuses.129 One may therefore wonder whether the WTO would 
be willing to apply Article XX(e) where the party creating the product is a 
government using punitive prison labor, or a company meeting all of the 
ILO indicators that evidence a prison labor relationship approximating that 
of a free labor relationship.130 Would the WTO look at Article XX(e) on its 
face, which seems to unequivocally and universally justify a ban on any 
product of prison labor, or would it look to the intent of the rule and hold 
that what the international community agrees are “acceptable” forms of 
prison labor do not in fact qualify for the Article XX exception? It is 
possible that the WTO will find the policy to represent arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination if it is overbroad in that it bans more forms of 
prison labor than captured within the stated policy objectives of the 
Member implementing the measure, i.e., if the Member itself allows certain 
forms of prison labor or bases the measure on a standard (like the ILO 
standard) that condones certain forms of prison labor. 
It is worth noting that an alternative means for circumventing the 
GATT’s various restrictions on “discriminatory” treatment is for a Member 
to obtain an explicit exception as part of its negotiated schedule of 
concessions.131 The U.S., for example, bans the importation of products 
made by convict labor, forced labor, and indentured labor as part of the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, under the Tariff Act of 
1930.132 GATT Article II governs import tariffs at the border, providing in 
relevant part that products identified in Part I of a Member’s Schedule are 
subject to the terms set forth in the Schedule.133 Although the U.S. would 
have a good chance of succeeding in effecting a similar outcome using the 
                                                
to review the reasons underlying certifications decisions, or to appeal those decisions. 
Id. ¶¶ 180-81. 
129 See supra notes 115-18. 
130 Id. 
131 See Subpart 0 (discussing schedules of concessions). 
132 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2006). 
133 See supra Subsection 0. 
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Article XX(e) exception for products of prisoner labor, according to GATT 
Article II, countries like the U.S. that pre-negotiated such bans (or other 
restrictions) into their WTO Schedules do not need to rely upon other parts 
of the GATT to support their otherwise discriminatory or trade-restrictive 
practices. 
But suppose that the U.S. seeks to use trade measures to combat 
perceived human rights violations beyond those related to prison labor, and 
suppose that another article of the GATT deems these measures to be 
discriminatory. Although GATT and WTO trade rounds have included 
debates on labor standards since 1948, the WTO never addressed the issue 
in its negotiating rounds, nor explicitly incorporated labor standards into its 
trade framework, in part due to opposition from developing countries.134 
Louis Henkin Professor in Human and Constitutional Rights and Faculty 
Co-Director of the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Sarah 
H. Cleveland, points to the Article XX(a) exception for measures 
“necessary to protect public morals” and the Article XX(b) exception for 
measures “necessary to protect human . . . life” as those that “most 
plausibly allow for human rights sanctions.”135 
 
B. GATT Article XX(a) – Public Morals 
 
Steve Charnovitz, Associate Professor of Law at The George 
Washington University, suggested that the American proposal to include a 
public morals exception clause when the GATT was negotiated was in 
defense of a series of trade restrictions already negotiated, including 
“intoxicating liquors, smoking opium and narcotic drugs, lottery tickets, 
obscene and immoral articles, counterfeits, pictorial representations of 
prize fights, and the plumage of certain birds.”136 Charnovitz concluded 
                                                
134 Joshua M. Kagan, Making Free Trade Fair: How the WTO Could Incorporate 
Labor Rights and Why It Should, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 198 (2011) (explaining that 
the labor rights issue received little support during the 1978 Tokyo Round and that, 
during the 1994 Uruguay Round, developing countries opposed a proposal to form a 
study group to examine labor rights in free trade); Robert Howse, Brian Langille & 
Julien Burda, The World Trade Organization and Labor Rights: Man Bites Dog, in 
Social Issues, Globalisation and International Institutions Labour Rights and the EU, 
ILO, OECD and WTO 192 (Virginia A. Leary & Daniel Warner eds., 2006) (explaining 
how developing countries defeated attempts by the United States and European Union 
to include a working group and working forum on labor at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial 
Conference). 
135 Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory 
of Compatibility 5 H. INT’L ECON. L. 133, 157 (2002). Joshua Kagan makes a similar 
assertion. Kagan, supra note 134, at 209. Columbia Law School, Sarah H. Cleveland, 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Sarah_Cleveland (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
136 Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689, 
706 (1998) (quoting a letter from Frank B. Kellog, Sec’y of State, to Wilson, Minister 
in Switzerland (Oct. 6, 1927) in 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF 
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that the drafting history shed little light on the meaning of the clause.137 
The exception subsequently went uninterpreted by the WTO for over fifty 
years, in part because Members were reluctant to challenge the exception 
out of concern that the inherent ambiguity of “public morals” meant that 
that too narrow or broad of an interpretation by the WTO could either 
threaten national sovereignty or lead to exploitative overuse of the 
exception.138 Consequently, the first jurisprudence regarding the 
circumstances enabling the invocation of part (a) of the General Exceptions 
Clause, allowing an exception where “necessary to protect public morals,” 
did not emerge until 2005 in U.S.–Gambling.139 
1. U.S. – Gambling 
 
U.S.–Gambling concerned a trade dispute brought by Antigua and 
Barbuda alleging the illegality of a U.S. ban on cross-border gambling and 
betting services, resulting in the decline of the Internet-based offshore 
gaming industry that accounted for ten percent of the island nation’s 
GDP.140 The U.S. justified its ban on online gambling as necessary because 
the service encouraged organized crime, money laundering, and fraud and 
consumer crimes, as well as endangering public health (related to gambling 
addictions) and children and youth (by increasing access to underage 
gambling), together posing “a grave threat to the maintenance of the public 
order and the protection of public morals.”141 U.S.–Gambling related to 
                                                
THE UNITED STATES 1927, at 254, 257 (1942)). The George Washington University, 
Steve Charnovitz, http://www.law.gwu.edu/faculty/profile.aspx?id=7541 (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2013). 
137 Charnovitz, supra note 136, at 704-05, 730-31. 
138 Id.; Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International 
Economic Relations: The Public Morals of Gatt's Article XX(a) and ‘Conventional’ 
Rules of Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75, 77 (1998) (observing that the 
“ambiguous and rather obscure wording of Article XX(a) invites possible misuse.”. 
This concern has not been fully resolved by newer case law). See infra notes 155-57 
(discussing the continuum between universalist and unilateralist interpretations of 
“public morals”). 
139 Mark Wu, Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals: An Analysis of the 
newly Emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine, 33 YALE J. INT. L. 215, 216 (2008). 
140 First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, United States–Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 35 WT/DS285 (Oct. 1, 
2003), available at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/business_politics/pdf/Antigua 
_First_Submission.pdf. 
141 See Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of the United States, 
United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, ¶ 22-23, 37, WT/DS285 (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute
_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file665_5581.pdf. 
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services rather than goods; however, the “public morals” clause of General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) Article XIV is substantially 
similar to the “public morals” clause of GATT Art. XX(a), such that the 
GATT “public morals” analysis from U.S.–Gasoline is relevant in 
interpreting the analogous “public morals” exception of the GATS and 
vice-versa.142 
Antigua countered the U.S. justification, arguing that the U.S. had shown 
“insufficient evidence of organized crime involvement,” that its regulatory 
scheme sufficiently addressed U.S. concerns, that the U.S. rejected offers to 
consult on Antigua’s gambling scheme in advance of instituting the 
measure, and that age verification and other technologies existed and 
“would be less restrictive on international trade than a total prohibition.”143 
Consequently, Antigua argued that the measure failed to meet the 
“necessary to . . .” requirement of the “public morals” exception, and that 
the discriminatory nature of the ban (vis-à-vis domestic service providers 
competing locally rather than remotely) violated the chapeau of GATS 
Article XIV(a), which requires measures protecting public morals to be 
nondiscriminatory.144 
In its decision, the WTO Panel defined public morals as “standards of 
right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation” and concluded that gambling could potentially fall under the 
exception.145 Nonetheless, the Panel held that in this case the U.S. failed to 
“provisionally justify” that its statutes were “necessary to protect public 
morals and/or public order within the meaning” of the “public morals” 
exception because it neglected to adequately explore possible alternatives, 
rejected Antigua’s offer to negotiate a compromise, and failed to prove 
convincingly that it treated foreign providers in a manner consistent with 
the manner it treated domestic providers of gambling services.146 The AB 
subsequently affirmed the Panel’s ruling that the U.S. had failed to 
demonstrate that its restrictions were nondiscriminatory vis-à-vis 
competing foreign providers of gambling services, but overturned the 
                                                
142 Jeremy C. Marwell, Note, Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals 
Exception After Gambling, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 804 (2006). 
143 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 3.288, 3.291, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) 
[hereinafter U.S.–Gambling]; First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra 140, ¶¶ 
42-74; Sir Ronald Sanders, Chief Foreign Affairs Representative with Ministerial 
Rank, Opening Statement at the First Panel Meeting in the Dispute Between Antigua 
and Barbuda and the United States on Internet Gambling ¶ 4 (Dec. 10, 2003), available 
at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/business_politics/docs/First_Panel_Meeting.doc. 
144 U.S.–Gambling, supra note 143, ¶ 3.292. Again, this exception is interpreted 
analogously with the “public morals” exception of GATT Article XX(a). See Marwel, 
supra note 142. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. ¶¶ 6.474, 6.531-35, 6.607-08. 
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Panel’s decision that it lacked the grounds to assert that the U.S. de facto 
failed to meet the “necessary to . . .” requirement because Antigua had not 
met its obligation to first identify a less restrictive alternative to a ban.147 
The AB decision in U.S.–Gambling unfortunately leaves several questions 
unanswered, including whether the exception can be applied only to 
“inwardly-directed” measures intended to protect a Member’s own citizens, 
as well as who defines what constitutes a “public moral.”148 
 
2. Implications of U.S.–Gambling in a Potential Labor Rights 
Application of Article XX(a) 
 
Experts distinguish “inwardly-directed” trade measures, put in place by a 
country to protect the morals of individuals within its jurisdiction, from 
“outwardly-directed” trade measures, implemented to protect the morals of 
individuals living beyond the country’s jurisdiction.149 A Member’s 
measure protecting foreign workers would have an “outwardly-directed” 
moral purpose.150 Prior to U.S.–Gambling, Members cited the “public 
morals” exception to justify inwardly-directed bans on pornography, 
narcotics, Kosher meat products (in Israel), and the importation of all 
alcohol (in Indonesia).151 Some countries even used the exception to justify 
overtly outwardly-facing trade measures. For example, the European 
Community banned furs caught in nations that did not ban the use of 
leghold traps in 1991, and the U.S. banned goods produced by indentured 
child labor in 1997.152 But because all of these trade restrictions went 
unchallenged, including ones based on religious grounds not explicitly 
mentioned in the exception itself or in the original public morals discussion 
surrounding Article XX(a)’s creation, it is unknown whether these various 
exceptions would have stood up if disputed.153 Moreover, because U.S.–
Gambling concerned an inwardly-directed measure by the U.S. 
                                                
147 Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, ¶¶ 311, 317-18, 343-57, 
367-72 (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter “Appellate Body Report, U.S.–Gambling”]. 
148 Wu, supra note 139, at 216, 226, 231-36. 
149 See Charnovitz supra note 136, at 695. Charnovitz provides as examples of 
“inwardly-directed” measures the government of Israel’s ban on non-kosher meat 
products and the U.S. government’s ban on the importation of “obscene” pictures as, 
but also notes that this distinction is inherently “somewhat arbitrary” because 
transactions always have two sides. Id. at 695-6. 
150 Id. at 696. 
151 See Wu supra note 139, at 222-23, Annex 1 (providing a complete list of trade 
restrictions that relied on Article XX(a) for justification). 
152 Id. at 223. 
153 Id. 
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Government to protect Americans from dangers that the government 
associated with offshore gambling, the decision left open the question of 
whether the U.S. could rely on the “public morals” exception to implement 
an externally-directed measure targeting foreign labor practices affecting 
non-U.S. parties. 
Although, as originally drafted, the public morals exception made no 
reference to human or labor rights, a number of commentators, and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), proposed that 
the WTO should dynamically interpret GATT Article XX(a) to include 
such rights.154 Mark Wu, Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law 
School, distinguishes universalism and unilateralism as two potential 
starting points for identifying those public morals that should fit within the 
scope of the moral exception, but notes that the universe of norms on which 
there is unanimous consensus may be both too small and too irrelevant, 
given that universally held norms are, by definition, unlikely to be 
challenged in the first place.155 Unilaterally-decided norms, on the other 
hand, would be subjective and also difficult to challenge if used merely to 
disguise protectionist trade measures.156 The Panel looked to existing 
international practices, whereby sixteen countries already restricted or 
prohibited Internet gambling, in determining that gambling could fall under 
the “public morals” exception, and in doing so, appeared to reject both the 
pure unilateralist and pure universalist approaches; however, U.S.–
Gambling did not ultimately define where, between those two extremes, a 
particular restriction must fall in order to meet the Article XX(a) moral 
exception.157 Additionally, Wu points out that the Panel and AB in U.S–
Gambling did not take a firm position regarding the extent to which a 
Member must prove the legitimacy of the moral asserted to excuse its trade 
measure, asserting only (ambiguously) that the public moral must be 
“prevailing,” while sending “mixed signals” by acknowledging some 
international rulings regarding the impacts of cross-border gambling but 
overtly disregarding others.158 
                                                
154 Id. at 224 (citing Treblicock & Howse, supra at note 17; Cleveland, supra at note 
120; Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade Organization 
Rules, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 219, 223 (2004); Salman Bal, International Free Trade 
Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 62, 78 (2001)); see also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement 
and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 753, 789 (2002); Office of the U.N. High 
Comm’r for Refugees, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using General 
Exception Clauses to Protect Human Rights, at 5, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/05/5 (Nov. 
2005). See Charnovitz, supra note 136 (providing an excerpt of the specific exceptions 
originally targeted by the U.S. negotiators).  
155 Wu supra note 139, at 231-32. Harvard Law School, Mark Wu, http://www.law. 
harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=949 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
156 Wu supra note 139, at 231-32. 
157 Id. at 232-33. 
158 Id. at 233-35. 
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At the same time, the decision in U.S.–Gambling did clarify that the 
“necessary to . . .” language would be applied using the same three-factor 
test applied for other exceptions using identical language, and that the 
language in the chapeau regarding “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” would be interpreted in conformity with the principles 
already established in prior cases.159 The Panel also stated “the content of 
[public morals] can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of 
factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious 
values.”160 Multiple scholars equate the U.S.–Gambling Panel’s language 
here, which subsequently went unmodified by the AB, to the “dynamic” or 
“evolving” standard for interpreting exception XX(g) offered in Shrimp-
Turtle.161 Specifically, the AB in Shrimp-Turtle acknowledged that the 
Article XX(g) exception for protecting natural resources did not at the time 
of its drafting include living species, but nonetheless held that the 
exception should now be interpreted as including them.162 The same 
explicit flexibility in the scope of what qualifies as a “public moral” is 
important because it means, doctrinally, that the “public morals” exception 
need not be interpreted as static and therefore might now be read as 
including labor rights not explicitly envisioned by the original signatories 
of the GATT as “public morals.” 
Looking back at the issues not fully answered by U.S.–Gambling, a labor 
rights justification based on an internationally agreed-upon convention 
such as the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
or the International Bill of Human Rights will have a good chance of 
succeeding, assuming that it is found “necessary” and is not “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination” under the common interpretations of the 
“necessary to . . .” clauses and the chapeau. Even if future WTO decisions 
fall on the more restrictive side of the universalism vs. unilateralism 
spectrum, we know from US–Gambling that total consensus is not required 
among member nations, so a generally accepted international convention 
would probably be adequate to justify a consistent action in moral defense 
of labor rights.163 Likewise, even if the legitimacy requirement is very high, 
                                                
159 Panel Report, United States–Gambling, supra note 143, ¶ 6.492; Appellate Body 
Report, U.S.–Gambling, supra note 147, ¶¶ 369, 371. Consequently, the chapeau 
analysis in an Article XX(a) case arguing for a labor rights exception would apply the 
chapeau in the same way seen above in the Article XX(e) analysis. 
160 Panel Report, United States–Gambling, supra note 143, ¶ 6.461. This language 
was not amended in the subsequent AB report.  
161 See, e.g., Kagan supra note 134, at 209-10; Wu supra note 139, at 230-31. 
162 U.S.−Shrimp, supra note 120, ¶ 129. 
163 Joshua Kagan suggests that “morals” should be defined based on standards put 
forward by the international human rights movement and that whether the morals are 
“public” should depend upon the degree of state adoption and ratification of 
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e.g., public opinion polls and legislative debates are found not to serve as 
adequate evidence to justify the sincerity of an asserted moral stance, an 
international convention that a country has signed (and consistently obeys) 
should represent strong enough evidence that the asserted moral standard is 
legitimate. Of all the public morals exception questions in US–Gambling 
left to future panels to decide, the one that creates the most uncertainty for 
the application of labor or human rights is the inwardly-facing/outwardly-
facing distinction. That is to say that, even if in the future a Member 
applies a measure that it demonstrates to be (1) necessary under the 
“necessary to . . .” condition, (2) nondiscriminatory under the chapeau, (3) 
consistent with modern interpretations of public morals under the dynamic 
interpretation language of US–Gambling, and (4) meeting a standard of 
public morality demonstrated by signed international convention to be both 
(A) nearly universal and (B) common, formal, and long-standing practice 
in the Member country, a future Panel may nonetheless rule that (5) a 
Member cannot justify an outwardly-directed trade restrictive measure, i.e., 
the measure can only be used to safeguard the morals of inhabitants within 
one’s own country.164 
It is additionally worth nothing that the 1994 WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement, which narrowly applies to government 
procurements only, has a somewhat more broadly worded version of the 
public morals exception.165 The text prohibits Members from preventing 
each other from taking measures “necessary to protect public morals, order 
or safety, human, animal or plant life or health or intellectual property; or 
relating to the products or services of handicapped persons, of 
philanthropic institutions or of prison labour.”166 In addition to some 
language similar to Article XX(e) and wording identical to Article XX(a), 
as well as some exceptions that do not appear in the General Exceptions 
Clause, this compound exception mimics the wording of Article XX(b), 
                                                
international human rights instruments, concluding that “the widespread state 
ratification of the labor rights provisions of the ICCPR, ICESCR, the ILO Declaration, 
and the ILO Fundamental Conventions creates a strong justification for viewing these 
rights as universal and public.” Kagan, supra note 134, at 210. 
164 Notably, Wu adds a further level of abstraction to Charnovitz’s 
inwardly/outwardly facing distinction by suggesting a three-part division: Type I 
restrictions safeguard the morals of inhabitants within one’s own country, Type II 
restrictions relate to the protection of those directly involved in the production of the 
product, and Type III restrictions target an exporting state which is engaging in 
practices that the importing state finds offensive not related to the production of the 
product. Wu, supra note 124, at 235. Here, the labor rights exceptions would fall under 
Type II. If future Panels choose to adopt this tripartite distinction approach, it is 
possible that certain outwardly-facing restrictions may be allowed (possibly including 
labor rights-related restrictions) while others are disallowed). 
165 GATT, at art. XXIII(2). 
165 Id.. 
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which protects animal and plant life or health.167 
 
3.  Later Jurisprudence on the “Necessary to” Standard 
 
Multiple WTO cases have examined the “necessary to” standard that 
appears in some of the Article XX exceptions, including Article XX(a). In 
2000 Korea–Beef, a dispute brought by the U.S. and Australia alleging an 
Article III:4 violation caused by Korea’s “dual retail system” for domestic 
and imported beef, the AB noted that “necessity” under Article XX does 
not require a showing that such measures are “indispensable.”168 The AB 
also clarified that “[t]he more vital or important [the interests or values put 
forward], the easier it would be to accept as “necessary” a measure 
designed as an enforcement instrument.”169 Finally, the AB noted that the 
“necessary” analysis should include a “determination of whether a WTO-
consistent alternative measure which the member concerned could 
‘reasonably employ’ is available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent 
measure is ‘reasonably available.’”170 These additional elements in the 
“necessary to” analysis left a large degree of predictive uncertainty.171 
The following year, EC–Asbestos revisited the issue, holding that the 
WTO dispute settlement body will be deferential to a Member’s claim 
regarding the degree of protection deemed adequate to secure the asserted 
public morals. 172 For the measure under dispute to be deemed “necessary,” 
however, it must be at least potentially capable of affording the same 
degree of protection that the Member claims it needs.173 
The aforementioned U.S.–Gambling case was the next to interpret the 
public morals exception in 2005, with the AB overruling the Panel decision 
that the U.S. did not satisfy the “reasonably available alternatives” element 
because it “failed to pursue in good faith a course of action that could have 
been used to explore the possibility of finding a reasonably available WTO-
consistent alternative” on the grounds that the defending party only has the 
burden of making a prima facie case that the measure is “necessary.”174 
                                                
167 Id. at XX(b). 
168 See Korea–Beef, supra note 54, ¶ 614. 
169 Id. ¶ 162. 
170 Id. ¶ 166 (quoting Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, ¶ 5.26, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989)). 
171 Christopher Doyle, Gimme Shelter: The “Necessary” Element of Gatt Article XX 
in the Context of the China-Audiovisual Products Case, 29 BOSTON U.L.J. 143, 155 
(2011). 
172 Appellate Body Report, EC–Asbestos, supra note 27, ¶ 172. 
173 Id. 
174 Appellate Body Report, U.S.–Gambling, ¶ 301, 309-11, 404. 
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After the defending party makes the prima facie case, the complainant may 
propose WTO-consistent alternatives, at which point the defending party 
must explain why those alternatives are not “reasonably available,” for 
example, because the alternative measure would be “merely theoretical in 
nature” (e.g., it would be unduly expensive or otherwise burdensome) or 
because it would not actually achieve the stated objective (as held in EC–
Asbestos).175 
Brazil–Tyres in 2007 restated the “necessary to” analysis as composed of 
two steps.176 After the proponent makes a prima facie case, a three-part test 
analyzes (1) the “relative importance” of the interests that the measures are 
intended to protect, (2) the extent to which those means contribute to the 
stated ends, and (3) the measure’s restrictive impact on international 
commerce.177 
China–Audiovisuals is a more recent WTO case from 2009 in which the 
Chinese unsuccessfully attempted to apply the “public morals” exception, 
and it is of particular relevance here because it analyzed the “necessary to” 
question in light of the language of the “public morals” exception from 
GATT Article XX(a).178 In that case, the U.S. alleged that China restricted 
the rights of both Chinese and foreign enterprises with respect to the 
importation and distribution of a wide variety of publications and audio-
visual products, in violation of the GATT, GATS, and two paragraphs of 
China’s WTO Accession Protocol.179 China did not appeal a finding by the 
Panel that some of these measures violated GATT Article III:4 and instead 
attempted to justify the measure under the GATT Article XX(a) “public 
morals” exception.180 In the end, however, the AB upheld the Panel’s 
finding that China failed to demonstrate that the national treatment 
violation was “necessary” to protect public morals and therefore the 
                                                
175 Id. 
176 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 
178, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil–Tyres]. 
177 Dispute Settlement Commentary for Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 13, WT/DS332/AB/R (2007) [hereinafter 
Commentary for Brazil–Tyres]). 
178 Report of the Appellate Body, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, ¶¶ 336-37, WT/DS383/AB/R, AB-2009-3 (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter 
China–Audiovisuals]. 
179 Report of the Panel, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, II.A, 
WT/DS383/R (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter “Panel Report, China—Audiovisuals”]; 
United States Trade Representative, 2009 U.S.T.R. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S 
WTO COMPLIANCE 23 (2009). See supra note 30 (discussing Protocols of Accession). 
180 Id. at II.A.; China–Audiovisuals, supra note 178, ¶ 469. China also violated its 
national treatment commitments under GATS Articles XVI and XVII. Id. at pp. 467-
69. 
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measure did not justify an exception under GATT Article XX(a).181 
Two major focuses in China–Audiovisuals include whether the “public 
morals” exception can apply to a claim arising from a source such as an 
Accession Protocol, which is neither a part of the GATT nor the GATS 
(which include analogous versions of the exception), and the appropriate 
standard to apply to the “necessary to” language that appears in multiple of 
the Article XX exceptions, including Article XX(a).182 The Panel and AB 
in China–Audiovisuals were in agreement that the “public morals” 
exception is available in Accession Protocol cases, but the reasoning 
behind that decision was unclear, leaving room for future debate.183 
The “necessary to” question was evaluated using the Brazil–Tyres three-
step analysis described above, beginning with the question of whether there 
is a “link between import entities, content, review, and the protection of 
public morals”; i.e., an assessment of the relative importance of the moral 
values at stake.184 The United States, however, conceded that the purpose 
of China’s measures was to protect public morals and instead argued that 
the measures were not “necessary” to protect those public morals per 
Article XX(a).185 
On the next question of the analysis, i.e., the question of whether the 
means used by China materially contributed to protecting the moral values 
asserted by China, the U.S. argued that China failed to show that the 
prohibition related to its goal of preventing inappropriate material, that 
allowing only a selective group of importers was not necessary for 
adequate content review, and that the measures went a step too far by 
calling for state ownership of import activities.186 The AB held that the 
Panel did not err in agreeing with the United States on this point; however, 
the AB clarified a perceived ambiguity in the Panel’s approach by 
specifying that the party applying the exception must demonstrate an actual 
(i.e., rather than merely apparent) contribution to protecting the moral value 
in question.187 
                                                
181 China–Audiovisuals, supra note 178, ¶ 415(d), (e). 
182 Doyle, supra note 171, at 145-46 (explaining that while the public moral 
exception is embodied in the GATT and GATS and not the Accession Protocol, such 
an exception should still be permitted as a defense of Accession Protocol claims. The 
body’s reasoning, however, is somewhat unclear. The Appellate body further interprets 
the “necessary to” portion of Article XX(a) based on its legislative history.). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 157-68; Panel Report, China–Audiovisuals, supra note 179, 7.751; see 
supra note 177 (providing the three part test from Brazil – Tyres). 
185 Panel Report, China–Audiovisuals, supra note 179, ¶ 7.756. 
186 Panel Report, China–Audiovisuals, supra note 179, ¶ 7.808-7.811. 
187 China–Audiovisuals, supra note 178, ¶¶ 290, 294. 
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The third factor from the Brazil–Tyres analysis is a balancing of the 
measure’s trade-restrictive impact on international commerce.188 Here, the 
U.S. offered a less restrictive alternative that would still permit China to 
review content before it passed through customs.189 The Panel agreed that 
the U.S. proposal would be “significantly less restrictive” than China’s 
intended approach without affording China inferior protection of public 
morals, concluding therefore that China failed both the second and the third 
parts of the Brazil–Tyres analysis and consequently lacked the justification 
required to receive an exception for its trade measure under Article XX(a), 
and the AB agreed with the Panel’s conclusion.190 
 
C. GATT Article XX(b) – Protection of Human Life 
 
The other exception under the General Exceptions Clause that might 
justify a Member’s otherwise discriminatory trade measure is Article 
XX(b), which provides an exception for measures “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health.”191 Robert Howse commented in 
2003 that various labor rights could plausibly be connected to human 
health, if human health is interpreted broadly to include physical and 
psychological well-being.192 Howse gave such examples as freedom of 
association, recognition of collective bargaining rights, and elimination of 
employment and occupational discrimination, noting that “[t]he other 
issues concerning whether the EU measures fit under Article XX(b) are 
quite similar to those that exist for Article XX(a).”193 Under this reading, 
and given that it uses the same “necessary to . . .” condition, Article XX(b) 
can be read as applying to the same variety of labor rights issues that would 
apply under Article XX(a), and can be applied using the same formal 
analysis as provided in the prior section for Article XX(a). 
Prior to Shrimp-Turtle, scholars were uncertain as to whether Article 
XX(b) could be applied in an outwardly-directed manner.194 Although the 
Shrimp-Turtle holding concerned an application of Article XX(g), later 
scholars viewed the “dynamic” standard articulated in the case as formally 
                                                
188 See supra note 177 (providing the three part test from Brazil – Tyres). 
189 Panel Report, China–Audiovisuals, supra note 179, ¶¶ 7.886-7.887. 
190 Id. ¶¶ 7.897, 7.907, 7.911; Appellate Body Report, China–Audiovisuals, supra 
note 178, ¶¶ 312, 322, 332, 415. 
191 See GATT, art. XX(b). 
192 Robert Howse, Back to Court after Shrimp/Turtle? Almost But Not Quite Yet: 
India's Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the European 
Union's Generalized System Of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1333, 1373 
(2003). 
193 Id. 
194 See Charnovitz supra note 136, at 714. 
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permitting outwardly-directed measures under Article XX(b).195 That may 
be too generous a reading of Shrimp-Turtle, which utilized an 
environmental application of Article XX(b), particularly because 
environmental offenses (e.g., killing endangered sea turtles) have tangible 
physical impacts traceable outside the borders of the offending country 
(e.g., reduced presence of sea life in international waters), whereas it is 
conceivably much more difficult to evidence harms caused outside a 
Member’s borders (other than with respect to economic competitiveness) 
arising from its domestic labor rights offenses. That is to say that, even if 
Shrimp-Turtle allows for new interpretations of the General Exceptions 
Clause not originally contemplated at the time of drafting, it is not 
necessarily the case that this extends to outwardly-directed measures; and 
even if it can apply to some outwardly-directed measures, Shrimp-Turtle 
itself describes a circumstance that is at least in some modicum inwardly-
facing, whereas a measure to require better labor standards abroad seems 
(at least in many cases) to be entirely outwardly-facing and therefore might 
be distinguished by the WTO as different from the circumstances of 
Shrimp-Turtle. 
A more recent case addressing the application of Article XX(b), albeit 
for a clearly inward-facing measure, is EC–Asbestos. In that case, the 
French Government imposed a ban on chrysotile asbestos, which was 
known to be harmful to human health despite its use in some industrial 
applications.196 The Panel found that the measure violated GATT Article 
III:4.197 Nonetheless, the Panel followed the approach of US–Gasoline to 
                                                
195 See supra notes 160-161 (referencing the “dynamic” or “evolving” standard that 
allows for reinterpretation of the parts of the General Exceptions Clause discussed in 
Shrimp-Turtle to be reinterpreted based on changing international norms); Fabio 
Pantano & Ricardo Salomone Trade, ILO Child Labour Standards and the Social 
Clause: Definitions, Doubts and (Some) Answers in CHILD LABOUR IN A GLOBALIZED 
WORLD: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ILO ACTION 334-35 (2008). 
196 Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products ¶ 8.815 WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter “Panel 
Report, EC–Asbestos”]. 
197 Id. Stating that “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported 
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use.” This determination was made in light of Note Ad 
Article III in the Notes and Supplementary Provisions in Annex I to the GATT 1994, 
which states that: “Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or 
requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product 
and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported 
product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal 
tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to 
in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III.” Interpreting 
the two clauses together, the Panel stated that “When a domestic measure applies to 
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find that the measure was (1) necessary insofar as the EC made “a prima 
facie case for the non-existence of a reasonably available alternative to the 
banning of [asbestos] products,” that the measure was (2) not on its face 
arbitrary or unjustifiable, (3) nor a “disguised restriction” on international 
trade per the conditions provided in U.S.–Gasoline.198 Consequently, the 
panel concluded that Article XX(b) provided an exception for the violation 
of Article III:4.199 On appeal, the AB affirmed the Panel’s ruling despite 
reversing some of its findings on legal grounds.200 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Whether a trade measure can, under the WTO Most Favored Nation and 
National Treatment rules, treat otherwise identical goods differently 
because one good is made under poor labor conditions and the other is 
made under labor conditions deemed acceptable by the international 
community depends largely upon whether the two goods will be considered 
“like” products under GATT Articles I or III.201 If the standard is that 
products merely need to be competing or substitute goods to be “like” 
products, it seems that they would not be distinguishable as other than 
“like” if the sole difference between the products is their respective 
processes of manufacture and if the production and process methods used 
do not relate to the final product (i.e., on the sole grounds of npr-PPMs). 
Although this view was affirmed in the un-adopted US–Tuna report, EC–
Asbestos and US–Superfund appeared to leave the door open to the 
possibility that npr-PPMs can be relevant to a likeness determination; 
however, it is unclear whether, at a minimum, some trace amount of 
process-related input must be physically present in the final product.202 
Looking at Japan–Alcohol, the AB corrected the Panel regarding the 
relevance of evidence that Japan’s disputed measure isolated Japan’s 
domestic product from foreign competition, emphasizing that this 
evidenced protectionism in violation of the WTO rules.203 Korea–Beef and 
EC–Biotech Products subsequently reaffirmed this focus on protectionism 
                                                
both domestic and imported products, Article III must apply.” Panel Report, EC–
Asbestos, supra note 196, ¶ 8.90. The Panel emphasized that, at the time of France’s 
decree banning asbestos, France was itself a producer of asbestos and, therefore, the 
measure “applies to an imported product and to the like domestic product” per Note at 
Article III. Id. at ¶ 8.91. After finding the similar asbestos products in question were 
like, the Panel concluded that the ban violated GATT Article III:4. Id. ¶ 8.158. 
198 Id. ¶¶ 8.222, 8.229 & 8.235-8.240. 
199 Id. ¶ 8.241. 
200 Appellate Body, E.C.–Asbestos, supra note 27, ¶ 192. 
201 Supra Part I. 
202 Supra notes 57-63. 
203 Supra notes 37-51. 
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as the overriding concern at the core of the likeness analysis when it put 
forward the principle of “no less favorable treatment,” which excuses 
differential treatment even where there is an economically competitive 
relationship between the products in question, so long as the treatment is no 
less favorable to the foreign imports than to the competing domestic 
product.204  
Looking broadly at the jurisprudence, Howse and Regan assert that the 
competitive relationship between two products is only instrumentally 
relevant in determining the main issue, which is whether the measure in 
question amounts to protectionism.205 This approach gets away from the 
product/process distinction, leaving open the possibility that a permissible 
trade measure may be founded primarily on process grounds (e.g., 
differences in applicable labor standards). Under this approach, it may be 
easiest for a Member to justify its actions as non-protectionist if the 
approach used is universal (i.e., what constitutes a reasonable standard for 
minimum wage may vary considerably from one country context to 
another, whereas the same ban on child labor or slavery could be equally 
appropriate in any country context). Other approaches to creating a WTO-
compliant labor-rights-focused trade measure include trying to introduce 
commonly agreed-upon labor standards, such as the ILO standards, through 
the TBT Agreement, and using the subsidies, dumping, and countervailing 
duties rules of the WTO to justify countervailing duties where a Member’s 
failure to enforce its own labor-related standards amount to a subsidy 
equivalent to a financial contribution by the government. 
But assuming that a labor-supporting trade measure is deemed 
discriminatory under one of the other Articles of the GATT, the Article XX 
General Exceptions Clause may in specific instances excuse and allow 
what would otherwise be a violation. GATT Article XX(e) provides a 
straightforward exception for trade measures targeting products of prison 
labor. The other two exceptions that may be applicable in the labor rights 
context are Articles XX(a) and XX(b); however, their scope is prima facie 
vague and must be understood in light of the various cases that interpret 
them. 
U.S.–Gambling was the first case that interpreted the “public morals” 
standard, not through Article XX(a) but instead through an analogous 
provision in the GATS.206 That case showed that the facial test for the 
“necessary to” standard does not require either that the party defending the 
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measure tried to negotiate with the other party to devise a more mutually 
acceptable alternative or that the complaining party came to the dispute 
proposing a less restrictive alternative to the measure in question.207 The 
other cases interpreting the “necessary to” standard applied the same 
approach, regardless of whether the measure fell under XX(a), (b), (d), all 
of which use the same “necessary to . . .” language as the GATS section 
referenced in US–Gambling.208 After US–Gambling, Brazil–Tyres provided 
an important three part test later applied in China–Audiovisuals, the first 
case to directly analyze the application of GATT Article XX(a) (i.e., rather 
than its GATS analog).209 There, the U.S. conceded the first step and the 
AB held that China failed to meet the other two parts of the test, and 
therefore failed to justify its measure under Article XX(a).210 Whereas the 
earlier EC–Asbestos case held that the measure must at a minimum be 
potentially able to accomplish the moral objective in question in order to 
make the prima facie case, China–Audiovisuals went a step farther by 
holding that the party defending the measure must ultimately show an 
actual (rather than merely a perceived) contribution to that goal.211 China–
Audiovisuals also confirmed that demonstration of a reasonable alternative 
measure that meets the moral objective of the measure in question through 
substantially less trade-restrictive means is evidence that the measure is not 
in fact “necessary.”212 
For a labor rights measure in particular, an important question remains 
whether the measure can be “outwardly facing,” i.e., apply to the public 
morals of countries other than the one advancing the trade measure under 
dispute. In this regard, the ability to demonstrate the universality of those 
morals may be a deciding issue. To that end, international treaties, e.g., the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work or the 
International Bill of Human Rights, may be instrumental in evidencing 
universal acceptance of some set of public morals concerning labor rights. 
In addressing the human and labor rights problems that persist in 
international trade, some commentators argue that the best way to improve 
international labor rights standards is to look for possibilities within the 
rules of the World Trade Organization, including the addition of explicit 
exceptions allowing trade measures intended to promote labor rights.213 
These commentators argue that, unlike other international institutions like 
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208 Doyle supra note 171, at 160. 
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the ILO or UN, the WTO has strong enforcement mechanisms.214 It is 
worth noting, however, that dissenting critics argue that linking labor 
standards and trade “is like spreading peanut butter on your steak” and can 
even produce destructive results.215 These critics believe that labor rights 
issues should be left to the ILO and other organizations designed for the 
purpose of promoting those issues.216 In the meantime, as future WTO 
decisions clarify the scope of application of Article XX(a) and Article 
XX(b) in the context of discriminatory trade measures justified on labor 
rights grounds, it will become more apparent whether the WTO is a forum 
that is appropriate for, and capable of, enforcing labor rights standards. 
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